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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Randi Marvidikis Hales, daughter of the owner of the Appellant 
corporation, Hales Sand and Gravel, died July 31,1986. Since her death 
occurred in the course of her employment, and since she left no dependents, 
the Appellant was ordered to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
The order was entered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -68 (2)(a). 
If the commission has made a determination that there are no 
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to the lapse of one year from 
the date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for 
the employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall 
thereafter be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after 
reaching the initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into 
either the Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may 
be required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near 
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced 
by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or due the 
deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a dependency 
claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter, 
a determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award 
shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the employer or 
insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted against the 
employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is filed within one 
year from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall 
become permanent and final. If no temporary order has been issued and 
no claim for dependency has been filed within one year from the date of 
death, the commission may issue a permanent order at any time 
requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into the Second Injury 
Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent must be filed with the 
commission within one year from the date of death of the deceased. 
This statute provides that an employer or the employer's insurance carrier may 
be required to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund should an 
employee die without dependents. The $30,000 becomes a mandatory 
payment if the amount in either the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second 
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Injury Fund falls below $500,000. A statutory funeral allowance of $1,800 is 
also required. 
The Appellant filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Industrial 
Commission challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 
(2)(a). Appellant claimed this statute unduly burdens the corporation and others 
similarly situated in that the corporation is required to stand the cost of 
insurance coverage for uninsured employers and consequently subsidize his 
competitors in the marketplace. 
The Industrial Commission denied Appellant's M6tion for Review and 
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge reauiring payment. 
Appellant brings this appeal as a result of that affirmation. 
Subsequent to these actions, through the efforts of the Appellant, the 
legislature repealed the statutory provision under which the payment was 
ordered. House Bill No. 208,1987 General Session. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant is required pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) to 
pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. This requirement stems from 
the fact that the daughter of the owner of the Appellant corporation died while 
working and left no dependents. 
The payment of monies into the Uninsured Employers' Fund constitutes a 
"tax". This is a "tax" rather than "compensation" as it is for a public purpose 
rather than a payment directly to an employee or his dependents as a result of 
the employee's injury or death. 
As a tax, this payment is subject to the principles of equal protection. The 
tax must operate equally on persons similarly situated and any classifications 
must not be arbitrary or adventitious. In this case, the statute is arbitrary and 
adventitious in that an employer is subject to pay the $30,000 based on the 
fortutious circumstance of whether or not an employee who is killed has 
dependents. 
The statute is also discriminatory as applied and as such an intentional 
and systematic violation of constitutional principles must be shown. Insured 
employers are subject to liability twice, once to pay their insurance premiums, 
and again to pay $30,000 should an employee die with no dependents. 
Uninsured employers, on the other hand, are subject only to the $30,000 
liability. This is a particularly harsh application considering Title 35 of the Utah 
Code is replete with avenues in which this fund can be supplemented by the 
uninsured employee and by which such employer can be forced to obtain the 
requisite insurance. The simple fact that insured employers are subject to a 
fund that even indirectly benefits uninsured employers is intentional 
discrimination. 
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The principles of substantive due process are also violated. The purpose 
of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) is to provide monies for those employees 
whose employers are not insured. It is irrational and unreasonable to put this 
burden equally upon insured and uninsured employers alike. Means are 
provided in Title 35 to coerce the payment of insurance premiums and those 
because of whom the law has been created must be required to bear the 
burden, rather than those who abide the law. 
House Bill No. 208 amends the harsh application of Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-68. This amendment is remedial in nature in that it remedies the defects 
of the former statute in order to promote rather than deter justice. Because the 
amendment is remedial, it must apply retroactively to the Appellant. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: PAYMENT INTO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND IS A 
TAX AS OPPOSED TO COMPENSATION AND MUST 
THEREFORE ABIDE EQUAL PROTECTION AND SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES 
A. The Payment Ordered Is A Tax As Opposed To Compensation. 
A "tax" has been defined as "every charge upon persons or property, 
inposed by or under the authority of the legislature for public purposes." See 
City of Madera V. Black. 181 Cal. 306, 310, 184 P. 397 (1919). Black's Law 
Dictionary. 5th Edition, defines "taxes", as "public burdens imposed generally 
upon the inhabitants of the whole state, or upon some civil division thereof, for 
governmental purposes, without reference to peculiar benefits to particular 
individuals or property." 
"Compensation", on the other hand, is defined in Webster's New 
International Dictionary as: 
That which constitutes or is regarded as, an equivalent or recompense, 
that which makes good the lack or variation of something else; that which 
compensates for loss or privation; amends, renumeration, recompense. 
As an example of "compensation", Webster's Seventh New Collegiate 
Dictionary provides that compensation is "payment to an unemployed or injured 
worker or his dependents." 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 makes it clear that compensation is a payment 
made either to an injured employee or to the dependents of such an employee: 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the 
dependents of every such employee who is killed, by accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment,... shall be paid compensation for 
loss sustained on account of the injury or death,... (emphasis added) 
Compensation then constitutes a payment directly to an employee or his 
dependents which serves as recompense for an injury suffered while on the job. 
This is the general sceme of the Worker's Compensation statutes. 
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By contrast, payments made by employers pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1 -68(2)(a) into a special fund created by the Legislature for the welfare of 
all workers in general is a tax. The Industrial Commission has sustained no 
loss and is not, therefore, compensated for the loss. No employee of the 
employer paying into the fund directly is benefited. Rather, the Commission 
"taxes" all employers and then uses these monies to provide financial support 
for employees when they are injured and their employers carry no insurance. 
Such support is provided without placing any additional burden on the injured 
employee's employer. Clearly, this constitutes a "public purpose" as it provides 
benefits for all workers in general. 
That money paid by employers into a fund is the equivalent of a tax has 
long been recognized. In Yosemite Lumber Comoanv y. Industrial Accident 
Commission. 187 Cal. 774, 782, 783, 204 P. 226, (1922), the Supreme Court of 
California found that the paying of money to the State Measurer by an employer 
upon the death of an employee with no dependents corlstituted a tax: 
Insofar as the act purports to exact from employers a sum to be used by 
the state for disabled workmen in general, it is in reality a taxing law, a 
revenue measure. It requires any employer to pay to the state a sum of 
$350.00 whenever one of his workmen who has no dependents is killed 
by an injury received in the course of his employment, and the fund thus 
raised is to be used for vocational re-education of workmen not 
connected in any way with such employer. ... This is purely a tax. 
(emphasis added) 
A later California case also concluded that payments into a Subsequent Injuries 
Fund where an employee died without dependents was a "tax measure." See 
People v. Standard Oil Company. 132 Cal. App. 563, 572, 23 P. 2d 86 (1933). 
In Industrial Commissioner v. McCarthy. 295 N.Y. 443, 68 N.E. 2d 434 
(1946) the New York Court dealt with a statute which provided that 
compensation and death benefits to be paid to an employee or his dependents 
would be doubled in amount if the injured dependents or killed employee was 
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under eighteen years of age at the time of the accident. In this case, the 
employee was a minor and died with no dependents. The employer thereupon 
contributed money into a "special fund" pursuant to a Labor Code statute. The 
employer defendant alleged that payment to the state rather than to a particular 
employee or his dependents was not "compensation." The Court agreed. 
New York again looked at the meaning of "compensation" in 
Commissioner of Taxation v. Buffalo Standard Foundry. 4 App. Div. 2d 894, 
895,167 N.Y. S. 2d 241 (N.Y. 1957). Here, an employer had paid the maximum 
amount of compensation required by statute to an employee suffering from a 
disease known as "silicosis." When the employee eventually died with no 
dependents, the employer paid $2,000.00 into state funds pursuant to another 
statute. The employer argued that the second payment into the state fund was 
unjustified as he had already paid the maximum amount of "compensation" 
required. The Court rejected this argument, stating: 
We are pursuaded that payments to special funds mentioned are in a 
wholly different category from ordinary awards and not to be considered 
as payment of compensation or death benefits in the ordinarily accepted 
meaning of these terms. (emphasis added) 
Another New York Court, in upholding an earlier decision where it found that 
payments made by the employer or the insurance carrier into a special fund 
was not an award of compensation, noted that such payments are not 
compensation, but rather "in lieu of an award of compensation." Matter of Martin 
v. Wurlitzer. 249 App. Div. 321, 323, 293 N.Y.S. 105 (1937). 
Other jurisdictions have similarly found that payments into funds do not 
constitute "compensation." In Schmahl v. School District No. 12 of Pine County. 
200 Minn. 294, 297, 274 N.W. 168 (1937), an employee of the school district 
was killed while working. Pursuant to the Minnesota statute, the school district 
was required to pay $200.00 into the "Special Compensation Fund" where the 
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employee had no dependents. When the school district failed to pay within 30 
days, the State Treasurer applied for a judgment in accordance with a statute 
dealing with defaults in the payment of compensation. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court upheld the lower court's denial of the treasurer's application, stating: 
[T]here has been no award of "compensation" to appellant within the 
meaning of this statute. Payments to the Special Compensation Fund 
are not compensation to injured employees or their dependents, nor are 
they compensation of any kind. They are simply fixed sums which, both 
as to amount and obligation to pay, are determined by statute. 
(emphasis added) 
The interpretation of "compensation" by the Texas courts also supports 
the idea that monies paid into funds set up by the Industrial Commission or the 
like are not "compensation." In Industrial Accident Board v. Texas Employers 
insurance Association. 162 Tex 244, 246, 345 S.W. 2d 718 (1951), the Court 
observed: 
The Board contends that when it seeks to recover from the Second Injury 
Fund, it is not a claimant of compensation under the terms of Section 5, 
Article 8307, V.A.C.S. That article provides, among other things, that 
when an appeal is taken from the award of the Board to the courts, that 
"the burden of proof shall be upon the party claiming compensation." We 
agree that the benefits received by the Second Injury Fund are not 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but are only 
payments into the Fund for the benefit of those receiving a second injury 
under the terms of the Act. (emphasis added) 
In light of the above discussion, there can be no doubt that payment by 
the Appellant of monies into the Uninsured Employers' Fund pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §36-1-68 (2)(a) will constitute satisfaction of a tax obligation rather 
than "compensation." 
B. The Imposition Of A Tax Must Abide Equal Protection Principles. 
"Equal protection protects against discrimination within a class. The 
legislature has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications but 
the court must determine whether such classifications operate equally on all 
persons similarly situated." State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance. 
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576 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1978). The concept of like treatment for those similarly 
situated was treated by the California Supreme Court in In re Gary W. 486 P.2d 
1201 (1971): 
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. nor 
the California Constitution (Article I, §§11, 21, Article IV, Section 16) 
precludes classification by the Legislature or requires uniform operation 
of the law with respect to persons who are different. The State may not, 
however, arbitrarily accord privileges to or impose disabilities upon one 
class unless some rational distinction between those included and those 
excluded from the class exists. The concept of the equal protection of 
the law compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly 
situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like 
treatment." (emphasis added) 
In the present case, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) imposes a tax upon 
the employer or his insurance carrier in the event a particular employee dies 
without leaving dependents. Should the employee die with dependents, the 
employer is not responsible for the payment of the $30,000.00. However, if the 
employee dies without dependents, the employer or his insurance carrier must 
pay the tax. This is clearly a classification. In State v. Tavlor. 541 P. 2d 1124 
(Utah 1978), it was noted that "a state must proceed upon a rational basis, and 
may not resort to a classification which is palpably arbitrary." 
C. Classification For Taxation Mav Not Be Arbitrary. 
As to taxes in particular, the California Supreme Court in Koenig v. 
Johnson. 71 Cal. App. 2d 739, 752,162 P. 2d 746 (1945) stated that: 
A tax measure, in order to be valid, must lay its burden uniformly upon all 
those who come within a proper classification of the persons to be 
subjected to its burden; and such a classification must have some 
reasonable basis for a differentiation between those who are and those 
who are not to be taxed; it must be founded upon some material, intrinsic 
or constitutional distinction, and a purely adventitious condition can form 
no reasonable basis for such a classification. (emphasis added) 
The unconstitutionality of tax classifications that are arbitrary or 
adventitious has been recognized in numerous cases. In State Tax 
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Commission v. Department of Finance. 576 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court found that a one percent tax on total premiums directed solely 
against the State Insurance Fund was unconstitutional. The Court noted many 
similarities between the State Fund and other insurers and found that the only 
difference was that the Fund was administered by a State agency. "This feature 
is not a rational basis to treat the Fund as a distinct classification." Id. at 1299. 
In the instant case, the only difference between employers who must pay 
into the fund and those who are not required to do so is that the paying 
employer was unfortunate enough to hire an employee who dies without 
dependents; hardly a rational basis on which to make a distinct classification. 
In John Tennant Memorial Homes v. Citv of Pacify Grove. 27 Cal. App. 
3d 372, 379-380,103 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1972), the Court found a city ordinance 
which imposed a tax on nonprofit corporations organized for charitable 
purposes to be unconstitutional. The tax was aimed at occupants of retirement 
homes which were exempted from property taxes. Elderly persons residing in 
profit-motivated retirement homes were not required to pay the tax. In finding 
that the ordinance denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws, the Court 
said: 
A statute violates the Equal Protection clause if it selects one particular 
class of persons for a species of taxation and no rational basis supports 
such classification. [Citation.]... [f] The question here, therefore, is what, 
if any, substantial differences exist between residents of nonprofit 
retirement homes and residents of privately owne i^ profit-motivated 
retirement facilities, not dedicated to charitable purposes, who are 
exempt from the tax ... [ffl It is readily apparent thai there is no possible or 
logical difference between an occupant living in a charitable retirement 
home and one living in a profit-motivated retirement home that would 
justify imposing a tax on the former while exempting the latter. 
It is readily apparent in the present case as well that "there is no possible 
or logical difference" between an employer whose employee dies without 
dependents and an employer whose employee dies with dependents. 
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The case with the most striking parallels to the one at bar is People v. 
Yosemite Lumber Company. 191 Cal. 267, 276-277, 216 P. 39 (1923). Here, 
the California Supreme Court struck down a statute similar to Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-68 (2)(a) in that it provided that an employer or his insurance carrier 
would pay $350.00 to the state treasurer should he have an employee die 
without leaving dependents. The statute was held to be in violation of equal 
protection principles: 
The Act of 1919 having been thus determined to be a tax measure it 
must, in order to be valid, be found to conform to the essential purposes 
governing taxation. Chief among these essential purposes is that of 
uniformity. A tax measure imposing a tax for revenue must, in order to be 
valid, lay its burdens uniformly upon all those who come within a proper 
classification of the persons to be subjected to the burden of the 
particular tax. [Citations.] The class of persons to be subject to the tax in 
question are employers. The law, considered as a revenue measure, 
must, in order to be valid, bear uniformly, either upon all employers in this 
state, or upon some portion of them who may be found to come 
reasonably within a narrower classification. The Act of 1919 considered 
as such a tax measure, attempts to make such narrower classification by 
confining the application of its burden to those employers only whose 
workmen killed in the course of employment leave no surviving 
dependents. Such a classification, in order to be valid, must have some 
reasonable basis for this differentiation. The only basis which is or can 
be argued in its support consists of the occasional and purely accidental 
circumstance that such employers happen to have such workmen having 
no dependents, killed in the course of their employment. // should 
require neither argument nor authority to show that such a purely 
adventitious condition could form no reasonable basis for the 
classification attempted by this Act, particularly in view of the other 
provisions thereof, by the terms of which the proceeds of this tax are to be 
devoted to the benefit, not of the employers required to pay the tax, nor 
even of their employees, but to the benefit and betterment of a class of 
persons bearing no relation to either, but who have been injured in other 
employment in the general course of industry. (emphasis added) 
A taxation statute which is predicated on the fortuitous circumstance of 
whether or not an employee who is killed has dependents has no basis in 
reason or justice. Therefore, the statute must be struck down as 
unconstitutional and the Appellant must not be required to pay $30,000.00 into 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
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D. Classification For Taxation Mav Not Be Discriminatory. 
One of the fundamental precepts of Equal Protection is to prevent 
discrimination amongst those similarly situated. In other words, "persons 
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." 
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P. 2d 661, at 669 (Utah 1984). Referring to the Utah 
Constitution in particular, Article 1, §24 protects against two types of 
discrimination: 
First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must 
be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objective of the statute. Id. at 670 
A law may not be discriminatory on its face, but may be applied in such a 
manner as to violate the principles of equal protection. Discriminatory 
application, however, is not found unless it is shown "that there is an intentional 
and systematic violation of those constitutional principles, or some designed 
effort to violate them, to the injury of the Complainant." thiokol Chemical 
Corporation v. Peterson. 393 P. 2d 391 at 396 (Utah 1964). 
In the instant case, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)^a) is not only arbitrary 
and capricious in that an employer's liability to the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
is based solely on whether or not an employee dies without dependents, but it 
is discriminatory as applied as well. 
The class in this situation is all business people Within the state who hire 
others to work for them. This class, however, is divided once again into those 
employers who carry the requisite liability insurance for their employees and 
those who do not. Aside from the arbitrary impact of this statute as already 
observed, the statute appears to apply evenly to all employers as all employers, 
whether they pay insurance or not, are required to pay to the Fund $30,000.00 
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should an employee die leaving no dependents. Nonetheless, the very 
existence of the Uninsured Employers' Fund reveals that there are those within 
the class of employers who are not paying their insurance as required by law. 
Because of this, the insured employer must not only pay his insurance, but must 
provide support by way of payments into the Fund for employees whose 
employers are not insured. The insured employee, therefore, is subject to 
double liability, while the uninsured employer is subject to liability under this 
statute only if his employee dies with no dependents. Furthermore, the 
uninsured employer is directly responsible for the double liability occasioned on 
the insured employer. This is obviously treating persons in different 
circumstances as if their circumstances were the same. (See Malan v. Lewis .^ 
If there is to be an Uninsured Employers' Fund, it should be supported by taxing 
only the uninsured employer upon the death of an employee with no 
dependents, and not the insured employer. 
In order to sustain an action for discriminatory application, it must be 
shown that the discrimination is intentional and systematic. Intentional does not 
mean that a bad motive must be shown, but merely that there has been a 
determination to act in a specified way. 
Creation of the Uninsured Employers' Fund and Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
68 (2)(a) were set up to provide for the general welfare of employees whose 
employers are not insured. That insured employers are also subject to the 
statute is intentional discrimination in that there can be no doubt that the insured 
employer will have to pay twice if he has an employee die without dependents, 
while the uninsured employer is only subject to liability once. In light of this, the 
legislature has determined to create the fund and make support thereof 
mandatory under the specified conditions. This intentional discrimination 
14 
becomes all the more onerous when other provisions iri Title 35 of the Utah 
Code are considered. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-46 (1) provides that all employers, including those 
in governmental entities, must insure their employees. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
46 (2) authorizes the Industrial Commission to bring suit against any employer 
who has not provided the requisite insurance. In this instance, a court can even 
enjoin the further operation of the employer's business until such time as the 
insurance has been procured. 
Provisions are also made for direct payment of penalties assessed 
against the uninsured employer into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-46.10 (1) provides that: 
The commission may also impose, at the time of the hearing, a penalty 
against the employer of not more than one and one-half times the 
amount of the premium the employer would have paid for worker's 
compensation insurance had that employer been insured by the State 
Insurance Fund during the period of noncompliance. This penalty shall 
be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1-
107 and used for the purposes of that fund. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -46.30 (1) further provides that all fines, funds, or 
penalties collected from or assessed against the uninsured employer shall be 
deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
In order that the Commission may know which employers have obtained 
insurance, and therefore by reason of deduction those who have not, insurance 
carriers writing workmen's compensation insurance coverage must notify the 
Commission. Failure to do so will result in a fine that alsb is deposited in the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-47 (1) and (2). 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-57 makes uninsured employers liable in a civil 
action for any injury received by an employee, as an alternative to 
reimbursement for the injury by way of the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
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Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) purposts to apply equally to all within the 
class of employers. However, as to the sub-classes included within the class of 
employers, namely the insured and the uninsured, application of the law has 
resulted in different treatment. Insured employers must pay once to insure their 
employees and once again into a fund established to reimburse employees of 
uninsured employers if an employee dies without dependents. Uninsured 
employers pay only once into the fund if an employee dies without dependents. 
Such treatment is not necessary to further the objectives of the statute 
and, furthermore, the statute would not be necessary if the Industrial 
Commission took the time and effort to enforce the aforementioned provisions of 
Title 35. Uninsured employers need be the only ones who pay into the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund as it is their avoidance of the law that necessitates 
such a fund. Title 35 is replete with methods for making sure all employers 
obtain insurance and for collecting fines and penalties to subsidize the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. Therefore, application of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
68 (2)(a) is an intentional and systematic discrimination that must be remedied. 
E. The Application of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (2)(a) To 
Appellant Is Violative Of Substantive Due Process Principles. 
"Substantive due process... deals with protection from arbitrary 
legislative action, even though the person whom it is thought to deprive of life, 
liberty or property is afforded the fairest of procedural safeguards. In 
substantive law such deprivation is supportable only if the conduct from which 
the deprivation flows is prescribed by reasonable legislation reasonably 
applied, ie. the law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, but must 
have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be obtained. "Gray 
v. Whitmore. 17 Cal. App 3d 1, 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971); Russell v. Carleson. 
36 Cal. App. 3d 334, 342-343, 111 Cal. Rptr 497 (1974). 
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As has been demonstrated above, application of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
68 (2)(a) to Appellant and others similarly situated is completely arbitrary in that 
the ultimate responsibility for the tax depends upon the existence or 
nonexistence of relatives of the victim. This statute is also unreasonable in that 
its effect is to intentionally discriminate against the class of insured employers 
by making them pay into a fund created as a result of employers who do not pay 
their insurance. There would be no need for the fund or at least a lesser need if 
the Industrial Commission would enforce the provisions provided in Title 35. 
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POINT II: UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1 -68 HAS BEEN AMENDED AND AS 
SUCH SHOULD APPLY TO APPELLANT AS THE AMENDMENT 
IS REMEDIAL IN NATURE 
The general rule is that statutes are construed as prospective only. 
However, remedial statutes are generally held to operate retrospectively so 
long as they do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested or contractual 
rights. Remedial statutes relate only to remedies or modes of procedure. See 
82 C.J.S. Statutes §416 (1984). 
Legislation that has been regarded as "remedial" in nature includes: 
[Statutes which abridge superfluities of former laws, remedying defects 
therein, or mischiefs thereof, implying an intention to reform or extend 
existing rights, and having for their purpose the promotion of justice and 
the advancement of public welfare and of important and beneficial public 
objects, such as the protection of the health, morals, and safety of society, 
or of the public generally. In re Brown's Estate. 215 P. 2d 203 
(Kan. 1950) 
The Tax Law is regarded as "remedial" and it has been found that "the 
statute authorizing court to correct illegalities, irregularities or errors in tax 
assessment is "remedial" and should be liberally construed to accomplish its 
objective." Duke Power Company v. Hillsborough Tp.. 26 A. 2d 713, 724 (N.J. 
Misc. 1942). 
Workmen's Compensation acts are also considered remedial in 
character and the provisions of these acts "should be construed broadly and 
liberally in order to effectuate their purpose which among other things is to 
benefit the working man." Nelson v. Department of Labor and Industries. 115 P. 
2d 1014, 1017 (Wash. 1941). 
In the instant case, House Bill No. 208 was signed into law by the 
Governor on March 16,1987. This Bill eliminates the payment of death benefits 
to the Uninsured Employers' Fund when an employee dies with no dependents. 
It further provides for additional sources of monies for this Fund. 
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This statute is remedial in character in that it does not destroy any vested 
or contractual rights. An employer whose employee died without dependents 
made no contract with the Industrial Commission to pay $30,000.00 into the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. Neither was such a right vested in the 
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(&). Rather, as has been 
argued above, the imposition of this amount upon the employer constitutes a tax 
and as such is remedial. 
The remedial nature of House Bill No. 208 is also evident in its purpose. 
Here, the Legislature is abridging the superfluities of the former law and 
remedying the defects and mischiefs therein by eliminating an unconstitutional 
provision that required employers to pay into a fund based on the fortuitous fact 
that an employee has died with no dependents. The Legislature is also 
remedying the unconstitutional application of the statute; in providing for 
additional sources of revenue for the Uninsured Employers' Fund rather than 
imposing double liability on those employers who are insured. 
House Bill No. 208 specifically states that it is "an act relating to 
Workmen's Compensation"; (See Addendum). As sucr^ , the Act is remedial 
and must, therefore, "be construed broadly and liberally in order to effectuate 
[its] purpose..." Nelson at 1017. The purpose is to correct the injustice wrought 
by Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -68 (2)(a). This will not be accomplished by a 
prospective application alone. "The promotion of justic© and the advancement 
of public welfare" demand that this remedial act be applied retroactively, 
particularly in light of the obvious and inherent unconstitutionality of the former 
statute. Any other application would only serve to inflate an already gross 
injustice, surely not the intent of the Legislature. 
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CONCLUSION 
A statute requiring an employer to pay a $30,000 death benefit when the 
employee has no dependents to benefit thereby is incongruous and 
indefensible under principles of equal protection and substantive due process. 
The Statute does nothing to serve the purpose of governing relations between 
an employer and hjs. employee. In recognition of this irrationality, the legislature 
has repealed the statute. 
By this particular case, the improper statute creates a particularly tragic 
result. The employer suffers not only the loss of his daughter but is penalized 
$30,000 which must be paid to the State, not her heirs, because she died so 
young as to have no dependents. This unconscionable result cannot stand. 
The award must be overturned. 
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0 
.1 AN ACT RELATING TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION; ELIMINATING PAYMENT OF DEATH 
.2 BENEFITS TO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS* FUND WHEN A DECEDENT LEAVES NO 
.3 DEPENDENTS; PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THE UNINSURED 
l4 EMPLOYERS' FUND; MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND PROVIDING AN 
[5 * EFFECTIVE DATE. 
L6 THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
17 AMENDS: 
18 31A-3-201, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 204 AND 211 [ LAWS OF UTAH 1986 
L9 35-1-68, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 211, LAWS OF UTAH 1986 
>0 35-1-71, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 138, LAWS OF UTAH 1979 
»1 35-1-107, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 211, LAWS OF UTAH 1986 
12 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utaft: 
23 Section 1. Section 31A-3-201, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
>4 amended by Chapters 204 and 211, Laws of Utah 1986^ is amended to read: 
25 31A-3-201. (1) Except for annuity considerations, insurance 
26 premiums paid by institutions within the state system of higher education 
27 as specified in Section 53-48-3, and ocean marine insurance, every 
23 admitted insurer shall pay to the State Tax Commissibn for deposit in the 
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General Fund, on or before March 31 in each year, a tax of 2-1/42 of the 
total premiums received by it during the preceding calendar year from 
insurance covering property or risks located in this state. This 
subsection does not apply to workers1 compensation and title insurance 
premiums, which are taxed under Subsections (2) and (3). The taxable 
premium under this subsection shall be reduced by: 
(a) all premiums returned or credited to policyholders on direct 
business subject to tax in this state; 
(b) all premiums received for reinsurance of property or risks 
located in this state; and 
(c) the dividends, including premium reduction benefits maturing 
within the year, paid or credited to policyholders in this state or 
applied in abatement or reduction of premiums due during the preceding 
calendar year. 
(2) [4a*)] Every admitted insurer writing workers1 compensation 
insurance in this state, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
under Chapter 3,, Title 35, shall pay to the State Tax Commission, on or 
before March 31 in each year, a tax of between 3-1/4Z and 3-3/4Z of the 
total premiums received by it from workers' compensation insurance in 
this state during the preceding calendar year. The percentage of premium 
applicable in any given year shall be determined by the Industrial 
Commission at least 90 days prior to the payment date, and any percentage 
of premium over 3-1/4% shall reflect the reasonable reserves necessary to 
maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided for in Section 35-1-107 
-2-
aaa H. B. No. 208 Ol|-31-87 5:35 PM nan 
in ao actuarily sound financial condition. This taxable premium shall be 
reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsections (1) (a) and (1) 
(b), but not as provided in Subsection (1) (c). The Stite Tax Commission 
shall remit from the tax collected under this subsection an amount equal 
to 3Z of the premium to the Second Injury Fund created under Subsection 
35-1-68 (1), 1/AZ of the premium to the General Fund, and any remaining 
applicable percentage of the premium to the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
created under Section 35-1-107• No tax that is to b^ transferred into 
the General Fund may be collected on premiums received from Utah public 
agencies. 
[£b}—Effectire-duiy-i7-i98?T-the-varTabi>e-tax-proTT|ded-in-SubsectTon 
^2^-ia^-shai5:-be-repiaced-by-a-fi:ar-tax-of-3-i/42T] 
(3) Every admitted insurer writing title insurance in this state 
shall pay to the State Tax Commission, on or before Match 31 in each 
year, a tax of .45Z of the total premium received by either the insurer 
or by its agents during the preceding calendar year from title insurance 
concerning property located in this state. In calculating this tax, 
"premium" includes the charges made to an insured under or to an 
applicant for a policy or contract of title insurance for; 
(a) the assumption by the title insurer of the risks assumed by the 
issuance of the policy or contract of title insurance; and 
(b) abstracting title, title searching, examining title, or 
determining the insurability of title, and every <j>ther activity, 
exclusive of escrow, settlement, or closing charges, whether denominated 
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1 premium or otherwise, made by a title insurer, an agent of a title 
2 insurer, a title insurance agent, or any of them. 
3 (4) Beginning July 1, 1986, former county mutuals and former mutual 
4 benefit associations shall pay the premium tax due under this chapter. 
5 All premiums received after July 1, 1986, shall be considered in 
6 determining this tax. 
7 (5) The following insurers are not subject to the premium tax on 
8 health care insurance which would otherwise be applicable under 
9 Subsection (1): 
J) (a) insurers licensed under Chapter 5; 
L1 (b) insurers licensed under Chapter 7; 
L2 (c) insurers licensed under Chapter 8; 
L3 (d) insurers licensed under Chapter 9; 
L4 (e) insurers licensed under Chapter 11; 
L5 (f) insurers licensed under Chapter 13; and 
L6 (g) insurers licensed under Chapter 14. 
L7 (-6) No insurer issuing multiple policies to an insured may 
L8 [artxficarry] artificially allocate the premiums among the policies for 
19 purposes of reducing the aggregate premium tax applicable to the 
20 policies. 
Zl Section 2. Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
22 amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1986, is amended to read: 
23 35-1-68. (1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the purpose 
24 of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2. This fund shall 
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succeed to all monies heretofore held in that fund designated as the 
"Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" and whenever reference is 
made elsewhere in this code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury 
Fund" that reference shall be deemed to be to the Second Injury Fund. 
I 
The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Second Injury Fund and 
the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration 
assistance may be paid from the proceeds of that fund. The attorney 
general shall appoint a member of his staff to represent the Second 
Injury Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims Against it. 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the 
1 
date of the accident , the employer or insurance carrier sha l l pay the 
bur ia l expenses of the deceased as provided in Sectioi^ 35 -1 -81 , and 
further benef i t s in the amounts and to the persons as fo l lows: 
[$z$—if—the—commission—hes-made-a-determiRatioR-that-there--are--no 
dependents-or-the-deceased7- i t -may7-prior-tc-a- iapse-of-ont-year-from-the 
iate~of-death-c£-a-deceased-empioyee7-issT3e-a—temporary—irder—for—the 
•apioyer—or—insarance-carrier-to-pay-into-the-Uninscrec-fppxoTers—Fnnd 
I 
:he-sora-cf-$367606T—When-the-amount-in—the—Bninsured—Enjpioyers--—Fend 
'caches—or—exceeds—$586766e7-the-$3676e6-shaxi-thereafte|r-be-paid-into 
he-Scconc-xnjury-rnndT—if-the-amount-in-the-Bninsurec—Embioyers-—Fnnd 
arrs-beiow-$5e879ee-at-an7-trme-after-reachrng-the-rnTtTaii-$58e7Bee7-the 
Draaission—shaix—direct—paymcnts-intc-either-tfae-Seconc-xn^cry-Fcnd-or 
ie~Hninscrec-5mproyers"Fand-as-may--be-reqt:ired-so--as—tc—[maintain—the 
linsnrec—Employers1—Fund—at—or—near—$5867096T—Beforehpayment-into 
-5-
ODD H. B. No . 2 0 8 0 1 - 3 1 - 8 7 5 : 3 5 PM caon 
e i ther - fond7- the-$387888-sha i i - be-redaced-by-the—amoant—of—any—weekly 
compensation-payments-paid-to-or-doe-the-deceased-between-the-date-of-the 
acc ident—and—deathr-—if—a-dependency-c ia im-is - f i ied-sobseqoent- to- the 
issaance-of-soch-an-order-and7-thereafter7-a-determination-of—dependency 
i s - -made--by-the-commiss ion7-the-award-shai i - f irs t -be-paid-oot-of - the-som 
deposited~for-credit-to-the—Hninsored—Empioyers-—Fond—or—the—Second 
in^cry-Fand-by-the-empioyer-or- insorance-carrier-before-any-forther-ciaim 
may—be—asserted—against—the—empioyer—or—insurance—carrierr—if-no 
dependency-ciaim-is- f i ied-within-one-year-from-the—date—of—death-—the 
eommission-s—temporary—order—shaii—become-permanent-and-finair—if-no 
temporary-order-has-been-issned-and-no—ciaim—for—dependency—has—been 
Fiied—within-one-year-from-the-date-of-death7-the-commission-may-issne-a 
permanent-order-at-any-time-requiring-the—carrier—or—empioyer—to—pay 
5367866—into—the—Second—in^ury-Fondr—Any-ciaim-for-compensation-by-a 
dependent-most-bc-fi ied-with-the-commission-within-one-year-from-the-date 
of-death-or-the-rieceesedT] 
[{b-)3 (a) ( i ) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of 
the death, the payment by the employer or insurance carr ier s h a l l be 
66-2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the i n j u r y , 
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the s t a t e average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury per week and not l e s s than a minimum of $45 per 
week plus §5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor c h i l d 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
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time of the injury, but not to exceed 85Z of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency 
for the remainder of the period between the date of tne death and not to 
exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the ir^ury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during 
dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period 
described in Subsection (2) [4b}3 (a) (i) shall be an amount equal to the 
weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent perjsons during that 
initial six-year period, reduced by 50Z of any weekly federal Social 
Security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the 
commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually 
thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts 
l 
and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a 
wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly 
benefits as the 
:kon (2) [*c*] (b) 
dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such 
commission may determine [pur5nant—to] under Subsect 
(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving 
spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly 
dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the employee. 
This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-ydar period and, 
in determining the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse, 
the commission shall exclude 50Z of any federal Social Security death 
benefits received by that surviving spouse. 
-7-
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[fc-^ 3 (b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of 
the death, the payment shall be 66-2/31 of the decedent's average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85Z of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for 
the remainder of the period between the date of death and not to exceed 
six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each 
case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of 
$30,000. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in 
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at 
the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this 
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent [pursuant 
to] under Subsection (2) [$b$] (a) (iii) shall be determined by the 
commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency 
existing at the time of the dependency review and may be paid in a weekly 
amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person 
would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons 
during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier. 
[£d}] (c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly 
dependent persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the 
benefits as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total 
benefits awarded to all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum 
provided for by law. 
-8-
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1 [£e}] (d) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the 
2 time of death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or 
3 its insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of 
4 dependency, including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed $30,000, 
5 the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between 
6 the amount paid and $30,000 into the Second Injury pund provided for in 
7 Subsection (1). 
8 Section 3. Section 35-1-71, as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of 
9 Utah 1979, is amended to read: 
10 35-1-71. The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly 
11 dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
12 (1) Children under the age of [eighteen] 1Q y e a r s x or over [snch 
13 « S « T 3 ^ physically or mentally incapacitated and I dependent upon the 
14 parent, with whom they are living at the tim^ of the death of such 
15 parent, or who is legally bound for their support. 
16 (2) For purposes of payments to be made under SJubsection [ { 2 * H b H H 
17 o f — s e c t i o n ] 35-1-68 (2) (a) (i ) , a surviving husband or wife shall be 
18 presumed to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with wpom he or she lived 
19 at the time of the employee's death. 
i0 In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, 
21 shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case 
12 existing at the time of the injury or death of such employee, except for 
>3 purposes of dependency reviews [pcrsnant to] under Subsection 
!4 USHbHiii?—or—section] 35-1-68 (2) (a) (iii)J No person shall be 
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1 considered as a dependent unless he or she is a member of the family of 
2 the deceased employee, or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal 
3 descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister* The word "child" as used in 
4 this title shall include a posthumous child, and a child legally adopted 
5 prior to the injury. Half brothers and half sisters shall be included in 
6 the words "brother or sister" as above used. 
7 Section 4. Section 35-1-107, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
8 amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1986, is amended to read: 
9 35-1-107. (1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for 
10 the purpose of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to workers1 
11 compensation benefits when every employer of the claimant who is found to 
12 be individually, jointly, or severally liable becomes or is insolvent, 
13 appoints or has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have 
14 sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to cover 
15 workers' compensation liabilities under this chapter. This fund succeeds 
16 to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity Fund. If it 
17 becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obligations 
18 of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the 
19 exception of penalties on those obligations. 
> 
20 (2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers1 Fund shall be provided 
21 [pursuant—to-SubsectTons-SS-i-fce-fS^—fa^-and] under Subsection 31A-3-201 
22 (2)* The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured Employers' 
23 Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable costs 
24 of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall employ 
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counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in ail proceedings 
brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund, and upon the 
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county 
attorney of the locality in which any investigation, nearing, or trial 
under the provisions of this title is pending, or in which the employee 
resides or an employer resides or is doing business, ^hall aid in the' 
representation of the fund. 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and oth^r benefits paid or 
payable to or on behalf of an employee or their dependents from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, 
powers, and benefits of the employee or their dependents against the 
employer failing to make the compensation payments. 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an 
insolvent employer is bound by settlements of covered ^laims by the fund. 
The court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments 
section a priority equal to that to which the claimint would have been 
entitled in the absence of this section against tne assets of the 
insolvent employer. Tne expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be 
accorded the same priority as the liquidatorfs expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file w}th the receiver, 
trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent employer or 
statements of the covered claims paid by the ruijic and estimates of 
anticipated claims against the fund which shall preserve the rignts of 
the fund for claims against the assets of the insolvent employer. 
maoe unoer tms 
insurance carrier 
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(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from 
the Uninsured Employers1 Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another person not in the same employment, the fund has the 
same rights as allowed under Section 35-1-62. 
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers1 Compensation 
Division of the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by 
adjusting its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, 
risk management company, insurance company, or other company that has 
expertise and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers1 compensation 
claims. 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon 
rendering a decision with respect to any claim for benefits under this 
chapter, shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 152 of 
the value of the total award in connection with the claim, and shall 
direct that the additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund. Award? may be docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the 
state treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, 
expenses, fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is 
limited to the assets in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way 
liable for the making of any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and 
payment of claims for compensation from the fund. 
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1 (11) In the event it becomes necessary for th^ Uninsured Employers' 
2 Fund to pay benefits [pnrsnant-to-the-provisTons-ofJ under this section 
3 to any employee of an insolvent self-insured employer, the Uninsured 
4 Employers1 Fund may assess all other self-insured employers amounts 
5 necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an 
6 insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered cl4ims subsequent to an 
7 insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and (d) 
8 other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each 
9 self-insured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium 
10 of the self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the 
11 manual premium of all self-insured employers for th^ preceding calendar 
12 year. Each self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not 
13 later than 30 days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be 
14 assessed in any year an amount greater than 2Z bf that self-insured 
15 employer's manual premium for the preceding calendar year. If the 
16 maximum assessment does not provide in any one year an amount sufficient 
17 to make all necessary payments from the fund for one or more insolvent 
18 self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid as soon as funds 
19 become available. All self-insured employers ari liable under this 
20 section for a period not to exceed three years after the self-insured 
21 employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance 
22 privileges within this state. This subsection do^s not apply to claims 
23 made against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency 
24 occurred prior to July 1, 1986. 
-13-
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(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the 
! Industrial Commission of any information indicating that any self-insured 
J employer may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its 
4 employees or the public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good 
5 cause appearing, the Industrial Commission may order an examination of 
6 that self-insured employer. The cost of the examination shall be 
7 assessed against all self-insured employers as provided in Subsection 
8 (11). The results of the examination shall be kept confidential. 
9 Section 5* This act takes effect on July 1, 1987. 
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STATUTES 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.--Every 
employee mentioned in §35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of every 
such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and 
medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided 
in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided 
under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. 
35-1-46 (1) and (2). Employers to secure workers' compensation 
benefits for employees - Methods - Failure - Notice - Injunction -
Violation. (1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, and school 
districts, shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for their 
employees: 
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation 
with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments shall 
commence within 90 days after any final award by the commission; 
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation 
with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the 
business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which payments 
shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the commission; 
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of 
financial ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner, and 
when due as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within 
90 days after any final award by the commission. In these cases the 
commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable security, 
indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they are 
incurred, and may at any time change or modify its findings of fact herein 
provided for, if in its judgment this action is necessary or desirable to secure or 
assure a strict compliance with all the provisions of law relating to the payment 
of compensation and the furnishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services, 
medicines, and burial expenses to injured employees and to the dependents of 
killed employees. The commission may in proper cases revoke any employer's 
privilege as a self-insurer. 
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in 
any court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act, 
from further operation of the employer's business, where the employer has 
failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways in this 
section provided. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, the court shall enjoin 
the further operation of the employer's business until the payment of these 
benefits has been secured by the employer as required by this section. The 
court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from the commission. 
If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more 
employees is conducting a business without securing the payment of 
compensation in one of the three ways provided in this section, the commission 
may give such employer five days' written notice by registered mail of such 
noncompliance and if the employer within said period does not remedy such 
default, the commission may file suit as in this section above provided and the 
court is empowered, ex parte to issue without bond a temporary injunction 
restraining the further operation of the employer's business. 
35-1-46.10. Notice of noncompliance to employer - Enforcement 
power of commission - Penalty - Procedure. 
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in §35-1-46, if the commission 
has reason to believe that an employer of one or more employees is conducting 
business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three ways 
provided in §35-1-6, the commission may give that employer written notice of 
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known address of the employer, 
and if the employer does not remedy the default within 15 days after delivery of 
this notice, the commission may issue an order requiring the employer to 
appear before the commission and show cause why the employer should not 
be ordered to comply with the provisions of §35-1-46. If it is found that the 
employer has failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three 
ways provided in §35-1-46, the commission is authorized and empowered to 
order any employer to comply with the provisions of §35-1 -46. The commission 
may also impose, at the time of the hearing, a penalty against the employer of 
not more than one and one-half times the amount of the premium the employer 
would have paid for worker's compensation insurance had that employer been 
insured by the State Insurance Fund during the period of noncompliance. This 
penalty shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by 
Section 35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that fund. 
35-1-46.30. Employer's penalty for violation - Notice of 
noncompliance - Proof required - Admissible evidence - Criminal 
prosecution. 
(1) Any employer who fails to comply, and every officer of a corporation 
or association which fails to comply, with the provisions of §35-1-46 is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. Each day's failure to comply is a separate offense. All 
funds, fines, or penalties collected or assessed shall be deposited in the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund created by §35-1-107 and used for the purposes of 
that fund. If the commission has sent written notice of noncompliance by 
registered mail to the last known address of the employer, corporation, or 
officers of a corporation or association, and the employer, corporation, or 
officers do not within ten days provide to the commission proof of compliance, 
the notice and failure to provide proof constitutes prima facie evidence that the 
employer, corporation, or officers were in violation of this section. 
35-1-47 (1) and (2). Notification of workers' compensation 
insurance coverage to Industrial Commission - Cancellation 
requirements - Penalty for violation. 
(1) Every insurance carrier writing workers' compensation insurance 
coverage in this state or for this state, regardless of the state in which the policy 
is written, shall file notification of that coverage with the Industrial Commission 
or its designee within 30 days after the inception date of the policy on forms 
prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Division of trfe Industrial 
Commission. These policies will be in effect from inception until canceled by 
filing with the commission or its designee a notification cj>f cancellation on forms 
prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Division within ten days after the 
cancellation of a policy. Failure to notify the commission or its designee will 
result in the continued liability of the carrier until the date that notice of 
cancellation is received by the commission or its designee. Filings shall be 
made within 30 days of the reinstatement of a policy, the changing or addition of 
a name or address of the insured, or the merger of an insured with another 
entity. All filings shall include the name of the insured, the principal business 
address, any and all assumed name designations, the address of all locations 
within this state where business is conducted, and after July 1,1987, all federal 
employer identification numbers or federal tax identification numbers. 
Noncompliance with the provisions of this section is grounds for revocation of 
an insurance carrier's certificate of authority in addition to the grounds specified 
in Title 31 A. 
(2) The commission may assess an insurer up to $150, payable to the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund, if the insurer fails to comply with the provisions of 
this section. 
35-1-57. Noncompliance - Penalty. 
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provisions of §35-1-46 shall 
not be entitled to the benefits of this title during the period of noncompliance, but 
shall be liable in a civil action to their employees for damages suffered by 
reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of employment caused 
by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's 
officers, agents or employees, and also to the dependents of personal 
representatives of such employees where death results from such injuries. In 
any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following 
defenses: the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of 
risk, or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and 
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence 
resulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the 
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any civil 
action permitted under this section against the employer the employee shall be 
entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed against the 
employer. 
